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Sammendrag 
Vi bruker paneldata for banker for 2001Q2-2010Q3 basert på kvartalsvise resultatregnskap og balanse 
for å studere hvordan bankenes finansieringskostnader påvirker deres innskudds- og utlånsrenter. Vi 
estimerer en økonometrisk modell på mikrodata aggregert opp til syv bankgrupper, definert slik at 
bankene i samme gruppe har felles OMF-foretak. Et system av ligninger for husholdningers 
innskuddsrente og to utlånsrenter (husholdinger og ikke-finansielle foretak) blir estimert simultant for 
tre typer renter og syv bankgrupper. Forklaringsvariablene i modellen er 3-månders interbank rente 
(NIBOR), volatiliten i denne (definert som standardavviket i dagsobservasjonene i NIBOR, beregnet 
kvartalsvis) og en indikativ spread på usikrede 3-års bankobligasjoner. Våre estimater viser klar 
evidens for ikke-komplett pass-through og vi finner liten grad av heterogenitet i hvordan bankene 
responderer på endringer i forklaringsvariablene når det gjelder innskuddsrenter og utlånsrenter til 
husholdninger både på kort og lang sikt. Det er imidlertid betydelig større heterogenitet mellom 
bankene når det gjelder lån til foretak. I en estimert likevektsrelasjon finner vi at 10 basispunkter 
økning i 3-månders NIBOR leder til 8 basispunkter økning i både innskudds- og utlånsrenter. Dette er 
et gjennomsnitt over syv bankgrupper, men parametrene er svært like på tvers av alle de syv 
bankgruppene.  Videre finner vi at kredittpåslaget (indikativ spread) har hatt stor betydning for 
utlånsmarginene og totalmarginene under og etter finanskrisen. I vår modell ser vi på de indikative 
spreadene på 3-års usikrede bankobligasjoner rapportert av DnB NOR Markets. Mens spreaden var 
nesten konstant frem til 2007Q4, økte den krafting under finanskrisen og bidro til økte utlånsmarginer 
relativt til 3-månders NIBOR. 
 
1 Introduction
In this paper we investigate the degree of pass-through from banksfunding costs to
their deposit and loan rates. We do so by estimating an econometric model utilizing
quarterly microdata on individual Norwegian banks from 2001Q2 to 2010Q3. Our
focus is on the transmission mechanism from changes in the level and volatility of
market interest rates to retail rates (in this paper dened as all interest rates on
deposits and loans set by the bank). Traditionally this issue has been examined
either by employing time series econometrics on aggregate bank interest rate data
(e.g., Chong, 2010; Hofmann and Mizen, 2004) or panel data methods on individual
banksinterest rates (e.g., Hannan and Berger, 1991; De Graeve et al., 2007). In
contrast, we consider the retail rates of various banks, when aggregated into seven
groups, as jointly dependent variables. Each bank group is dened so that the banks
in the same group have a common covered bond mortgage (OMF) company.
There is a related empirical literature on interest rate margins using banksnet
interest income relative to total assets as the main dependent variable, either at the
aggregate level (for a representative bank) (e.g., Saunders and Schumacher, 2000;
Andersen et al., 2008) or, more rarely, at the bank level (e.g., Maudos and Guevara,
2004). These approaches su¤er from the weakness that the dependent variable is a
mixture of price (interest rate) and volume e¤ects. It is not straightforward to infer
anything from these studies about how banksinterest rates and interest margins
respond to changes in exogenous variables, because di¤erent e¤ects are entangled.
We employ a detailed panel data set with quarterly accounts data on all Nor-
wegian banks from 2001Q2 until 2010Q3. This period is particularly interesting
because it is characterized by increased competition between banks, as well as pro-
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ductivity growth due to wider use of Internet-based payment services. In the data,
volumes and interest rates over a quarter are specied for various types of deposits
and loans, according to sector (such as households or nonnancial rms) and type
of loan (mortgage, other loans). Microdata allow us to study heterogeneity between
banks, for example, whether the interest margins of di¤erent banks react di¤erently
to exogenous shocks. Moreover, we are able to analyze di¤erences in interest mar-
gins between loans to businesses and households, and in the speed of adjustment
of banksinterest rates to changes in exogenous variables. The existence of bank-
specic dynamics in retail rates implies that estimates of long-run coe¢ cients from
aggregate data will be biased, even if the primary interest is in the parameters of
the (long-run) relation between retail rates and funding costs of an average (or rep-
resentative) bank (cf. Pesaran and Smith, 1995). This paper addresses this problem
by estimating a exible model with heterogeneous, bank group-specic equations.
By aggregating the estimated bank-group specic equations, the corresponding em-
pirical relation for a representative bank can be obtained.
More specically, we focus on (i) loans to households, (ii) loans to corporations
in the nonnancial sector and (iii) householdsbank deposits. The corresponding
interest rates are collected from all banks (or bank groups), placed in one system
of equations and analyzed within the framework of dynamic factor modeling. The
comovements among various bank groupsretail rates are then captured by a small
number of common factors. As a result, we are able to separate the e¤ect on retail
rates of common observed variables (such as interbank market rates) from the e¤ect
of unobserved common variables (reecting, for example, changes in bank regula-
tions, competition and productivity). In accordance with most empirical literature
on interest margins (e.g., Saunders and Schumacher, 2000), our model includes an
interbank market rate; the three-month Norwegian Inter Bank O¤ered Rate (NI-
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BOR), as a main explanatory variable.
Our empirical framework allows us to test particular hypotheses about both the
short run and the long run (steady state) relation between changes in market rates
on banksretail rates. In particular, we investigate three types of interest margins
at the bank group level: the di¤erence between (i) the household loan rate and the
deposit rate, (ii) the corporate loan rate and the deposit rate and (iii) the average
net interest margin: the ratio of total funding costs to total loans. The latter is
a measure of banksearnings per unit in total outstanding loan, not the di¤erence
between two interest rates. In a competitive bank market, a permanent change
in the marginal cost of wholesale funding should be passed fully over to loan and
deposit rates (see Hannan and Berger, 1991). However, if banks have market power,
they are faced with a trade-o¤ between conicting goals: a high (low) interest rate
on loans (deposits) on the one hand and a high volume of loans and deposits on the
other. The spread between the price of market funding and retail rates may therefore
change as a result of a change in the former; that is, there may be incomplete pass-
through in both the long and the short run. The completeness hypothesis will be
formally tested.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main
concepts and describes the empirical model, Section 3 presents the data, Section 4
presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 The modeling framework
Funding costs Banks need to raise funds to provide loans. We organize these
funds into two categories: customer deposits and wholesale funding (market fund-
ing from private and institutional investors, including other banks). According to
lenders, the marginal funding source for loans to households and businesses is whole-
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sale funding. Banks may need to raise a large amount of funding over a short period.
This cannot be done through raising retail deposits by increasing the rates on de-
posits, because bank customers (households and rms) typically do not react quickly
to changes in interest rates. Wholesale funding is typically bonds, which to varying
degrees match the expected maturity of the loans provided. There may be consid-
erable heterogeneity between banks with regard to the extent and composition of
market funding (e.g., regarding the maturity of debt). In this paper we interpret the
marginal funding cost as that of raising senior unsecured bonds. An unsecured bond
may be issued with a xed or variable interest rate. In the rst case, a Norwegian
bank typically enters into an interest rate swap to achieve a level of variable rate
exposure that matches the variable rate loans. The bankscosts may be expressed
by two components: the variable rate cash ows paid in the interest rate swap (nor-
mally three-month NIBOR) and the xed cash ow due to the issuer-specic credit
spread over the swap rate1. In this paper we include both the three-month NIBOR
and the spread of unsecured senior bonds issued by Norwegian banks as measures
of the cost of market funding. The spread of unsecured senior bonds is represented
by the indicative spreads on three-year bonds as reported by DnB NOR Markets.
The net interest margin is the di¤erence between the interest that a lender re-
ceives on all loans and the interest it pays on all funding of those loans divided by
total loans. In our analysis we distinguish between two categories of loans: those
to businesses (in the nonnancial sector) and those to households. If LH ; LB and
D denote loans to households, loans to businesses and bank deposits, respectively,
with corresponding interest rates rH ; rB and rD, and r denotes the (average) market
1See https://www2.sparebank1.no/portal/1001/3_privat?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=
page_privat_innhold&aId=1201861729341 for examples of bank bonds with varying matu-
rity and with interest payments equal to the three-month NIBOR plus a xed credit spread.
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interest rate, the average net interest margin, , can be expressed as
 =
(rH   r)LH + (rB   r)LB + (r   rD)D
LH + LB
. (1)
 thus involves three interest spreads relative to the NIBOR rate: rH r, rB r and
r   rD. It is obviously important for banksprotability how the market rate (r)
is passed through to the retail rates (rH , rB and rD). Assuming that the residual
outstanding loan LH + LB   D is nanced by variable rate market funding at the
rate r,  will be a measure of the average protability per NOK in outstanding
loans. A complementary issue, deferred for later study, is how interest rate changes
a¤ect demand for loans and supply of deposits.
Econometric model As mentioned above, our analysis distinguishes between two
categories of loans: loans to businesses and households (the personal market). The
corresponding loan rates for bank group i (i = 1; :::; 7) at time t (t = 1; :::; T )
are denoted by rBit and r
H
it , respectively, where t refers to the end of a particular
quarter in the given year. The interest rate on bank deposits is denoted by rDit : At
this level of aggregation, rDit ; r
H
it and r
B
it can be calculated as weighted averages of
more disaggregate interest rates, where the weights are available from the outgoing
balance in the bank accounts data (see Section 3).
Our explanatory variables represent the exogenous funding costs of banks and the
associated risk. The main variable is the three-month NIBOR rate, rt, which is a key
determinant of external funding costs, as explained above. For the individual banks,
it is reasonable to assume that rt is exogenous; that is, the individual bank cannot
inuence NIBOR through its supply of and demand for credit in the interbank
market. The rationale behind this assumption is that (major) banks can borrow
and lend NOK through the foreign exchange rate markets such as the NOKUSD
exchange swap market. Covered interest rate parity implies that the NIBOR rate is
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determined by international lending and swap exchange rates, which are exogenous
to individual Norwegian banks.2
We also include the volatility of rt, t, as an explanatory variable. This variable
is a proxy for interest rate risk, as described by Ho and Saunders (1981). In the
Ho and Saunders model, banks nance the di¤erence between the demand for loans
and the supply of deposits by wholesale funding. If banks are risk averse, the
interest margin between the loan rate and the deposit rate will be increasing in the
volatility of the market rate.3 As described in detail in Section 3, in our empirical
implementation, rt and squared volatility, 2t , are weighted averages of daily interest
rates and daily squared interest rate deviations (from the mean), calculated each
quarter, with geometrically decaying weights.
Our econometric model species a stochastic relation between the retail rates
(rDit ; r
H
it ; r
B
it ; ) and the exogenous variables (rt; t; st) for each bank group. It accom-
modates the following important features:
 asymmetries in the relation between the retail rates and rt, depending on the
sign of rt = rt   rt 1;
 exible short-term dynamics, where di¤erent rXit , X = D;H;B, are allowed to
react di¤erently to exogenous shocks;
 bank group-specic parameters; stochastic shocks that are common across
di¤erent bank groups (i) and type of interest rate (X);
 stochastic shocks specic to a particular bank group and interest rate.
2For an example, see equation (1) in Akram and Christophersen (2011): http://www.norges-
bank.no/upload/publikasjoner/sta¤%20memo/2011/sta¤_memo_0111.pdf
3This model has been developed further, for example by Allen (1988), to incorporate di¤erent
types of deposits and loans, and by Angbanzo (1997), to allow both credit and interest rate risk.
Empirical models of interest rate volatility and implications for interest rate risk are examined by
Chan et al. (1992).
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Conditional on the common explanatory variables, we model the individual re-
tail rates as univariate autoregressive processes, augmented with common dynamic
factors to account for joint dependencies. The use of common dynamic factors is a
parsimonious way of capturing the comovements among variables. In contrast, the
number of parameters in a VAR models increases exponentially with the number
of equations. Examples of dynamic factors are the so-called di¤usion index mod-
els (see Forni et al., 2000, and Stock and Watson, 2002) and the factor-augmented
VAR model, FAVAR (see Bernanke et al., 2005). Our approach has more in com-
mon with the tradition of multivariate structural time series models than with the
approximate dynamic factor models most commonly favored in the literature.4
In our most general specication we assume that, for X = D;H;B; i = 1; ::; 7
(seven bank groups); and t = 1; :::; T :
rXit = 
X
i + 
X
i;0rt + 
X
i;1rt 1 + 
X
0 max(rt; 0) + 
X
1 max(rt 1; 0) +
Xi;0t + 
X
i;1t 1 + 
X
0 st +
piX
j=1
Xij r
X
i;t j +
mX
k=1
Xikfkt + e
X
it , (2)
where Xi is a bank group- and interest rate-specic xed e¤ect, the -parameters
capture the e¤ects of the NIBOR rate by allowing both the current NIBOR rate,
rt (through Xi;0), and the lagged NIBOR rate, rt 1 (through 
X
i;1), to a¤ect the
current interest rate on loans (X = H;B) and deposits (X = D). One lag is allowed
in order to capture the e¤ect of notication rules that restrict the speed at which
banks are allowed to increase their loan rates. Moreover, asymmetries in the e¤ects
of positive and negative changes are captured by the term X0 max(rt; 0) and the
lagged term, X1 max(rt 1; 0). For example, if 
D
0 is negative, the bank deposit
rate rDit is changed more slowly as a result of a given positive change (rt > 0) than
for the corresponding negative change. The e¤ects of changes in the volatility, t, of
the NIBOR rate are determined by the bank group-specic parameters, whereas
4See Harvey (1989) for a general exposition of structural time series models.
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the credit spread measure, st, is assumed to a¤ect each bank group through common
parameters X0 (X = D;H;B). The latter restriction is imposed in view of the very
limited variation in st before 2008 (see Section 3).
The autoregressive parameters Xij , j = 1; :::; pi, determine how the e¤ects of a
shock in any of the exogeneous variables evolve over time. The number of lags, pi,
is allowed to di¤er from bank group to bank group. Using the Akaike information
criterion, we nd that pi = 2 is adequate in most of the equations. Finally, the
unobserved stochastic terms consist of m dynamic factors, fkt, k = 1; :::;m, which
pick up the dependencies across banks due to common, unobserved variables (e.g.,
e¤ects of the business cycle, credit market regulations and competition) and the
idiosyncratic error term, eXit , that is, independent across banks (i) and over time
(t). The vector (eDit ; e
H
it ; e
B
it) is assumed to have a trivariate normal distribution,
with covariance matrix , whereas the dynamic factors, fkt, are assumed to be
independent, Gaussian AR(1) processes:
fkt =  kfk;t 1 + kt, kt  IN (0; 1); k = 1; :::;m: (3)
Thus, f1t; :::; fmt are latent stochastic processes that capture the comovements be-
tween the interest rates of di¤erent banks not accounted for by the observed ex-
planatory variables. The impact of the dynamic factors on the individual banks is
determined by bank group-specic impact coe¢ cients, Xik. In our model the factors
play a similar role to that of the risk factor contributionsin Rosen and Saunders
(2010), in the context of portfolio risk analysis. Our model is estimated by em-
ploying a version of the maximum likelihood algorithm described in Raknerud et al.
(2010).
Partial e¤ects Our econometric framework allows us to disentangle partial e¤ects
of changes in exogenous variables. In particular, we are interested in the e¤ects of
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changes in market rates. Assume now that the system is in a steady state at t dened
by rt j = r, t j = , st j = s, fk;t j = fk (i.e. arbitrary xed values) and eXi;t j = 0
for all i and j > 0. Let rXi;t+j() denote the causal e¤ect r
X
i;t+j = r
X
i;t+j   rXi;t+j 1
due to a permanent change in rt from rt 1 = r to rt+j = r +  for j  0, Then
rXit () = 
X
i;0 + 
X
0 max(; 0)
rXi;t+1() = 
X
i;1 + 
X
1 max(; 0)  X0 max(; 0) + Xi1rXit ()
rXi;t+2() = 
X
i1r
X
i;t+1() + 
X
i2r
X
it ()  X1 max(; 0)
...
rXi;t+k() = 
X
i1r
X
i;t+k 1() + :::+ 
X
ipi
rXi;t+k pi() (k  pi).
The e¤ect of a permanent change, initiated at time t, on rXi;t+h is then given by
the cumulative sum
Ph
j=0r
X
i;t+j(). Moreover, in an equilibrium path where all
observed exogenous variables are assumed to be have permanent values, rt = r,
t = , st = s, we have
rXit =
Xi
1 Ppij=1 Xij +
 
Xi;0 + 
X
i;1
1 Ppij=1 Xij
!
r+
 
Xi;0 + 
X
i;1
1 Ppij=1 Xij
!
+
 
X0
1 Ppij=1 Xij
!
s+dt+"
X
it ,
(4)
where dt captures the e¤ects of the present and lagged dynamic factors, fjs, s  t,
and "Xit is a moving average of the error terms e
X
is , s  t. Equations (4) therefore
determines the long-term relation between the retail rates and permanent levels of
the exogenous variables. We see that if the bank-group specic parameters di¤er
across bank-groups, the parameters of the weighted average
P7
i=1wir
X
it , where wi is
the share of total assets (see Table 1), generally di¤er from parameters obtained by
aggregating the variables rst and then estimating the aggregate version of equa-
tion (2). This fact motivates an analysis of a more disaggregate level even if the
main interest should be on aggregate results for the whole banking sector or for a
representative bank.
12
3 Data
The sample consists of quarterly accounts data on all Norwegian banks from 2001Q2
until 2010Q3 and is based on the accounts statistics for nancial corporations assem-
bled by Statistics Norway.5 Bank-level data are aggregated into seven bank groups,
as listed in Table 1. The grouping is done so that all banks in each group have
a common covered bond mortgage (OMF) company. Covered bonds (OMFs) were
introduced in Norway in June 2007 and have become an important source of funding
for Norwegian nancial services groups and banking alliances.6 Key statistics for
the seven bank groups are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for seven bank groups.
Percentage of market Percentage of bank loans
Total assets Loans to Loans to Deposits Households Firms
households businesses
DnB NOR 42 33 32 35 64 35
Subsidiaries of foreign banks 14 13 17 12 60 40
Branches of foreign banks 13 11 17 10 54 46
SpareBank1-alliansen 15 20 17 19 68 32
Terra Gruppen 4 7 4 6 77 23
Other savings banks 10 14 11 13 70 30
Other commercial banks 3 3 3 4 69 31
Since 2001Q2, Norwegian banks have been obliged to report interest rates at the
end of each quarter. We calculate the average interest rate of the banks in a group
as a value-weighted average of the reported interest rates. From the bank statistics
we get interest rates and volumes of various loans in each bank. The interest rates
are weighted by the corresponding nominal book values to obtain a value-weighted
average interest rate. The three-month e¤ective Norwegian Inter Bank O¤ered Rate
(NIBOR) reported by Norges Bank is a proxy for the cost of long- and medium-term
market nancing. Illustrations of these interest rates are provided in Figure 1. The
5See http://www.ssb.no/skjema/nmark/rapport/orbof/ (in Norwegian).
6See the following article by Rakkestad and Dahl in Penger og Kredit 1/2010 (in Norwegian):
http://www.norges-bank.no/Upload/80111/OMF_marked_i_vekst_PK_1_10_nov.pdf
13
graph labeled NIBOR +/- sigmashows the range of daily NIBOR rates that lie
within one standard deviation of the mean within the corresponding quarter.
In our econometric model, the quarterly NIBOR rate, rt, and the corresponding
volatility, t, are operationalized as follows: Let rt;j, j = 1; :::;Mt, denote the NIBOR
rate of day j in quarter t, whereMt is the number of trading days in quarter t. Then
rt =
1
kt
Mt 1X
j=0
jrt;Mt ;j,
with kt =
PMt 1
j=0 
j. To measure squared volatility, 2t , we calculate the weighted
mean of the squared deviations (rt;j   rt)2:
2t =
1ekt
Mt 1X
j=0
j(rt;Mt j   rt)2,
where ekt = PMt 1j=0 j. In our application we use  = 0:9 and  = 0:5, which
means that the weight attached to the rst observation in the quarter relative to the
latest observation is about 10 percent when calculating rt, whereas only the latest
45 observations have nonnegligible weight when 2t is calculated. These parameter
values approximately maximize the in-sample t of the model when a grid search is
conducted over possible - and - values.
As explained above, the cost of market funding depends on the credit spread
over the swap rate, denoted st. We use an index consisting of indicative bid spreads
based on average trading levels over the swap rate (three-year xed/three-month
NIBOR) for senior bonds issued by a range of Norwegian banks since 2001. The
series includes DnB NOR Bank, Nordea Bank Norge and a representative selection
of banks of various sizes and ratings. It is clear from Figure 2 that until 2008 the
variation in funding cost was dominated by variations in NIBOR. However, from
2008Q1 to 2008Q4, the spread increased dramatically, and was still much higher
than its pre-2008 level at the end of 2010. The (issuer-specic) spread may consist
of compensation for types of risk other than credit risk. During the nancial crisis, a
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substantial part of the spread was compensation for liquidity risk; that is, it occurred
largely because of reduced liquidity in funding markets.7 The combined e¤ect on
banksfunding costs is di¢ cult to assess. This is the motivation for our choice to
include the credit spread as a separate variable in the econometric model, rather
than adding it to the NIBOR rate to obtain an estimate of total long-term funding
costs.
Data for issuance indicate that the banks reduced their ordinary funding activ-
ity dramatically during the period 2008Q1 to 2008Q4, when the the credit spread
soared. At the same time, several authority measures to support banks funding
took e¤ect. In particular, a marked reduction in the policy rate led to a sharp fall in
the NIBOR rate. The combined e¤ect is that from 2008Q2 we observe a marked fall
in deposit margins and an (o¤setting) increase in the margins of loans to households
(relative to NIBOR). A possible explanation is that when the policy rate becomes
very low, banksopportunity to lower their deposit rates is limited, and the deposit
margin falls. To compensate for the reduced margins on deposits, the banks may
increase their margins on loans. Moreover, banks have a limited ability to quickly
adjust the rates on loans because of notication rules, which may contribute to
temporary high margins on loans during periods of falling policy rates.
There is considerable heterogeneity in the funding sources of banks. Small na-
tional banks tend to have more deposits than foreign or large national banks, while
the latter banks rely more on market funding. For example, Terra Gruppen, which
is a group of small banks, had the highest average ratio of household deposits over
total loans during 2001-2010: 42 percent. The two foreign bank groups had the
lowest ratio 18 percent while Norways largest bank, DnB NOR, had a ratio of
29 percent. Figure 3 shows the di¤erence in average deposit interest rates between a
7See Chapter 3 (especially Figure 3.16) in Bank of Englands Financial Stability Report, Issue
27, June 2010: http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2010/fsrfull1006.pdf
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group of small banks and a group of large banks. While the gure reveals consider-
able short-term uctuations, there appears to be no systematic long-term di¤erence
between the deposit rates of these two bank groups.
Examining the stationarity of rt To perform statistical tests and assess esti-
mation uncertainty, it is important to know whether the NIBOR rate is a unit root
process or not, because this a¤ects the asymptotic distribution of the maximum
likelihood estimator of the empirical model (2). Taking as a starting point the as-
sumption that rt is not a unit root process, we can test this hypothesis using the
test proposed by Choi (1994) in combination with Andrews(1991) automatic lag
truncation procedure, as recommended by Choi and Ahn (1999). We conducted the
test both on daily data (yielding 2724 observations) and quarterly data. In neither
case did we reject the null hypothesis of stationarity. For example, based on daily
data the test statistic becomes 0.21, which is far from signicant (P-value=0.45).
This result is consistent with Choi and Ahn (1999), who do not reject that the real
interest rate is stationary, using monthly data for several countries for 19801991
(Norway not included). Supporting evidence is provided by Anundsen and Jansen
(2011), who reject the null hypothesis that the real interest rate is integrated of
order one against the alternative of stationarity, using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test on quarterly NOK interest rate data for 19862008. Although we use nominal
interest rates in our analysis, our data come from a period with ination targeting
and a low and stable ination rate. Note that stationarity of rt does not necessar-
ily imply stationarity of the retail rates, rXit , because the common dynamic factors,
fkt, could be nonstationary. Thus there may be a (stochastic) trend in the spread
between retail rates and the NIBOR rate and/or in the loan and deposit interest
margins, for example due to changes in competition or regulatory measures. This
16
exibility of our model is empirically important, because Figure 4 reveals a distinct
decreasing trend for the interest margins between loans and deposits over the sample
period.
4 Results
The results presented below are based on a version of the model (2) with X0 = 
X
1
= 0 for X = H;B. These zero restrictions were imposed because the estimates of
X0 and 
X
1 were almost zero and clearly insignicant for both types of loans. On
the other hand, we obtain a signicant negative estimate of D0 equal to  0:22 (std.
error= 0:06) and a negative, but insignicant, estimate of D1 equal to  0:08 (std.
error= 0:06). Thus the deposit rate falls more quickly than it rises, but the loan
rate does not.
Equations (5) are estimates of the long-run (steady-state) equations (4) for a
representative bank. These estimates are obtained from the corresponding bank-
group specic equations, using the estimates shown in Table 2. Standard errors in
parentheses are obtained by the delta method. We see that for the representative
bank, the coe¢ cient of r in the steady state is close to 0:8, and is signicantly
below one for all three retail rates. Thus the hypothesis of complete pass-through
in the long run is clearly rejected. If we examine the bank group-specic estimates
in Table 2, they are remarkably close to 0:8 across bank groups and interest rates.
A formal test of whether all the steady-state coe¢ cients of r are equal across all
bank groups is provided by the Wald tests reported in the last row of Table 2.
Evidently, we cannot reject the hypothesis of homogeneous long-run parameters.
The corresponding equations for the di¤erences between the household loan rate
and the deposit rate, and between the business loan rate and the deposit rate, are
shown in (6). We see that in the steady state, these two interest margins do not
17
depend on r, because both estimates are almost zero. Note that the marked fall in
deposit margins and increase in the margins of loans to households observed from
2008Q2-2008Q4 (cf. Figure (2) and the discussion in Section 3) are consistent with
our estimated model: a fall in the NIBOR rate will lead to an increase in the loan
margin which is o¤set by a decrease in the deposit margin.
With regard to the intercept of the steady-state equation, Table 2 shows that the
bank group-specic parameters vary considerably across bank groups, but also that
the estimation uncertainty is considerably larger than for the steady-state coe¢ cients
of r. The results from the Wald test show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that
banks have the same steady-state intercept with regard to deposits, although we do
reject it with regard to both types of loans.
Turning to the credit spread measure, the results in (5) show that permanent
changes in st have no signicant long-run e¤ect on the deposit rate. On the other
hand, an increase in the credit spread induces a signicant positive pressure on
the loan rates, especially loans to businesses. Recall that the underlying (short-run)
parameters X0 are common across banks, so we only report common long-run e¤ects
(i.e. a weighted average of the coe¢ cient of s in (4)). The estimated e¤ects on the
margins between the loan rates and the deposit rate in (6) indicate that a permanent
unit increase in the credit spread leads to a long-term increase in these interest rate
margins from roughly 0:3 to 0:4. It should be noted, however, that the estimated
e¤ects are identied mainly by events immediately before and after the onset of the
nancial crisis in 2008Q3 and must be interpreted with care, as discussed in Section
3.
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7X
i=1
wir
D
it = dt + 0:77
(0:05)
r + 0:58
(0:24)
   0:08
(0:08)
s+ residual
7X
i=1
wir
H
it = dt + 0:80
(0:05)
r + 0:74
(0:27)
 + 0:22
(0:12)
s+ residual
7X
i=1
wir
B
it = dt + 0:84
(0:07)
r + 0:70
(0:33)
 + 0:32
(0:14)
s+ residual (5)
7X
i=1
wi(r
H
it   rDit ) = dt + 0:03
(0:03)
r + 0:16
(0:15)
 + 0:30
(0:07)
s+ residual
7X
i=1
wi(r
B
it   rDit ) = dt + 0:07
(0:4)
r + 0:12
(0:24)
 + 0:40
(0:09)
s+ residual (6)
Let us now examine the impact of interest rate volatility, . The bank group-
specic parameter estimates shown in Table 2 reveal a high degree of statistical
uncertainty regarding the impact of . Nevertheless, as predicted by economic
theory (e.g., Ho and Saunders, 1981), the aggregate equations (5) show a signicant
positive relation between  and the retail rates.
Figures 5 and 6 display the partial predictive power of r and , respectively, when
all the other variables in the model (observed and unobserved) are kept constant over
time. When the graphs are constructed, all variables except that on the horizontal
axis are kept constant at the sample average, whereas the data points are ordered
according to the variable on the horizontal axis. Comparing the actual data and
the tted interest curves in Figure 5, we see that the partial predictive power of r
is quite good. On the other hand, using  as (the sole) explanatory variable results
in large prediction errors, as evident in Figure 6.
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The estimated autoregressive parameters, Xij , corresponding to the bank group-
specic retail rates, and the AR(1) coe¢ cients  k, corresponding to the three com-
mon dynamic factors fkt, are displayed in Table 3. The number of lags is equal to
two in most cases. These choices were made by applying the Akaike information
criterion (see Raknerud et al., 2010, for details regarding model selection in a simi-
lar model). All the lag polynomials 1  Xi1L  Xi2L2 (where L is the lag operator)
have roots well outside the unit circle, so the individual retail rates clearly evolve
as stationary processes after subtracting the e¤ects of the three common dynamic
factors fkt, k = 1; 2; 3. However, two of the dynamic factors are estimated to be unit
root processes, so the retail series themselves are not stationary but evolve around a
stochastic trend. These trends pick up, among other things, the decrease in average
loan-deposit interest margins over time that is evident from Figure 4. The down-
ward trend in both household and business interest margins over time may occur
because of increased competition and increased productivity in the banking sector,
e.g. due to Internet-based payment services.
The Wald tests reported in Table 3 reveal that there is signicant bank group-
specic heterogeneity in the interest rate dynamics with regard to the rst-lag para-
meter, Xi1. On the other hand, the hypothesis that 
X
i2 has a common value across
banks could not be rejected for any retail rate. The estimated autoregressive para-
meters are typically less than 0.2 in absolute value, with Xi1 > 0 and 
X
i2 < 0. These
estimates imply that retail rates adjust quickly to exogenous shocks.
Figures 78 depict the estimated response curves for the representative bank, that
is, the increase (decrease) in retail rates as a function of time, given a permanent
positive (negative) unit change in NIBOR (r = 1). We see that all three curves
are quite close, and stabilize at around 0.8, that is, jrX j ' 0:8jrj. Moreover,
the loandeposit interest margins displayed in Figures 910 are not signicantly
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changed at any point in time following the increase in NIBOR. The condence
intervals in the gures reect the statistical uncertainty in the estimates of the
interest rate response functions of the representative bank. As noted above, there
exists signicant asymmetry between the short-run e¤ects of a unit increase and a
unit decrease in the NIBOR rate. The speed of adjustments following a permanent
unit increase ( = 1) and a decrease ( =  1) are further displayed in Table 4.
Almost all of the adjustment is completed by the end of the rst quarter after the
change in NIBOR (quarter 1), and approximately one-third to a half of the full
adjustment is conducted in the same quarter (quarter 0). The exception is the
deposit rate when NIBOR increases; then, the adjustment in the same quarter is
estimated to approximately one-fth on average, reecting some rigidity in deposit
rates in the case of a positive shock in the market rate. Table 4 reveals little, if any,
systematic di¤erences across bank groups.
Viewed in conjunction with the expression for banksaverage net interest margin
 in (1), our estimates reveal that  decreases with the level of the market rate, r,
when r increases: the margins rH   rD and rB   rD remain unchanged, but the
spreads on the loan rates relative to NIBOR, rH   r and rB   r, decrease (because
the coe¢ cients of r are signicantly less than one in the steady state). On the other
hand, r  rD increases. In a perfectly competitive market, any increase in marginal
funding costs, r, should be passed through to all retail rates. However, faced with
a downward-sloping demand curve for loans, banks balance the positive price e¤ect
and the negative e¤ect on the demand for loans when increasing their loan rates.
Similarly, when faced with an upward-sloping supply curve for deposits, banks will
take into consideration that deposits will decrease when the deposit rate is lowered.
The presence of such e¤ects is conrmed by our nding that the coe¢ cients of r in
(5) are clearly below one for all retail rates. This is in line with De Graeve et al.
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(2007), who also analyze microdata, but contrary to most evidence from aggregate
bank data (see De Bondt, 2002, for an overview).
The development in the average net interest margin of a representative bank
when the NIBOR rate increases is illustrated in Figure 11. Here it is assumed
that the average price of market funding in the quarter is equal to the three-month
NIBOR. This assumption is not entirely realistic. First, the credit spread is ignored.
Second, the average cost of market funding will not follow the NIBOR rate (the
marginal cost) in the short run. The upper chart examines a scenario where the
NIBOR rate is (cet. par.) gradually doubled from 2.6 at the beginning of quarter
0 to 5.2 percent at the end of quarter 0, and then remains permanently at this
level. A tripling of the NIBOR rate to 7.8 during quarter 0 is illustrated in the
lower chart of Figure 11. The immediate negative impact on the net interest margin
is clearly visible. In the short run the banks can only partially adjust their retail
rates, while (oating rate) market funding immediately becomes more costly. After
45 quarters,  stabilizes at a new but signicantly lower level than the initial level
because of incomplete pass-through. The peculiar nonmonotonic pattern in  in
Figure 11 occurs because of the catching-up e¤ect on the interest margins that
follow the immediate decrease in  displayed in Figures 910. There is considerable
heterogeneity between banks with regard to the e¤ects of an increase the NIBOR
rate. Bank groups with a large share of market nancing (such as DnB NOR) are
more vulnerable when NIBOR increases rapidly than are banks with a smaller share
of market nancing (such as Terra Gruppen). Banksaccess to deposit nancing
makes them less vulnerable to short-run uctuations in the NIBOR rate. On the
other hand, to increase its market share a bank needs to rely more on market funding,
which makes it more vulnerable to shocks in the market rate.
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5 Conclusion
We have used a dynamic factor model and a detailed panel data set with quarterly
accounts data on all Norwegian banks to study how banksfunding costs a¤ect their
interest rates. We found clear evidence of incomplete pass-through from the market
rate to retail rates, with lending rates increasing more and deposit rates increasing
less than the market rate. In our analysis the cost of market funding was estimated
by the three-month Norwegian Inter Bank O¤ered Rate (NIBOR) and the spread
of unsecured bonds issued by Norwegian banks. .
Our estimates show that a unit increase in NIBOR leads to an approximately
0.8 increase in banksretail rates (both loan rates and deposit rates) in the long run.
These ndings are consistent with each bank facing a downward- sloping demand
curve for loans and an upward-sloping supply curve for customer deposits. While
the margin between loan and deposit rates remains unchanged when the NIBOR
rate increases, the spread between the loan rate and the NIBOR rate decreases.
The results indicate that banks balance a positive price e¤ect and a negative e¤ect
on the demand for loans when deciding on an increase in lending rates. There is
also a signicant positive relation between the indicative credit spread of uncovered
bonds issued by banks and loan rates, especially regarding loans to businesses. The
estimated e¤ects on the interest rate margin between loan and deposit rates indicate
that a permanent unit increase in credit spread leads to a long-term increase in the
interest rate margins of roughly 0:3 to 0:4.
The econometric relations established in this paper should be useful in a stress
test framework, where one is typically interested in how shocks in market rates or
policy rates a¤ect banks lending rates and net interest margins. Another topic,
which is currently of great policy importance, is how the e¤ect of tighter capital and
liquidity requirements, as proposed in the Basel III reform, will a¤ect bank rates (see
26
Angelini et al., 2011). For example, the reform is expected to increase the average
maturity of bankswholesale funding, which will increase the credit spread relative
to NIBOR if the yield curve is increasing. To the extent that the direct impact
of these regulatory measures on the (indicative) credit spread can be assessed, our
econometric framework can be used directly to estimate the impact of such changes
on lending rates and interest margins.
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Figure 1: Three month NIBOR rates and average bank interest rates on deposits
and loans to rms and households
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Figure 2: The NIBOR rate and interest rate spreads relative to NIBOR on i) loan
to housholds (rH   r), ii) bank deposits (r  rD) and iii) unsecured bank bonds (s)
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Figure 3: The deposit interest rate di¤erence between a group of small banks and a
group of large banks
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Figure 4: Interest rate margins between loans and deposits 2002-2010. Weighted
average across banks
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35
Figure 5: Actual data and tted interest rate curves from estimated steady state
equation using NIBOR as sole predictor
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Figure 6: Actual data and tted interest rate curves from estimated steady state
equation using volatility as sole predictor
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Figure 7: Estimated interest rates response functions: e¤ects of a unit increase in
NIBOR (in quarter 0). Average across banks
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Figure 8: Interest rates response functions: e¤ects of a unit decrease in NIBOR (in
quarter 0)
40
41
Figure 9: Changes in the di¤erence between the household loan rate and the deposit
rate following a unit increase in NIBOR for a representative bank. Zero corresponds
to no change relative to the initial (quarter 0) interest rate margin.
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Figure 10: Changes in the di¤erence between the business loan rate and the deposit
rate following a unit increase in NIBOR for a representative bank. Zero corresponds
to no change relative to the initial (quarter 0) interest rate margin.
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Figure 11: The estimated change in net interest rate margin when increasing NIBOR
from 2.6 to 5.2 and 7.8 per cent, respectively. Weighted average across bank groups
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